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ABSTRACT
Most UNIX operating systems are not delivered with adequate facilities to address
password management in medium to large, heterogeneous environments. The System for
Password Management (SPM, pronounced spam) provides multiple levels of user veriﬁcation
beyond the normal password veriﬁcation procedure, both local and centralized password
database management, a consistent command interface across multiple platforms and multiple
password database types, fast and efﬁcient updates to large NIS passwd databases, proactive
password checking, and password aging. SPM is intended to replace the passwd, yppasswd,
nispasswd, chfn, chsh, ypchfn, ypchsh, and rpc.yppasswdd programs, although it can run
without replacing these programs.
Introduction
The ever increasing number of UNIX users and
rapidly expanding popularity of direct Internet access
is quickly increasing the number of novice computer
users. Subsequently, there is also an ever expanding
number of people trying to subvert computer security
systems. The large number of novice computer
users provides more opportunities than ever for
intruders to illegally access computer systems as
well as greatly increasing the demand on system
support staffs.
The tools provided by most UNIX vendors usu-
ally are not well designed to handle this situation in
large, heterogeneous environments. Most UNIX sys-
tems provide inconsistent command interfaces, in
some cases none at all, to change a user’s password,
full name (GECOS) information, or login shell.
Sun’s Solaris 2.4 operating system, for example,
requires each user to explicitly know where their
password information is stored and run the appropri-
ate command (i.e., passwd for /etc/passwd,
ypppasswd for NIS, and nispasswd for NIS+) Furth-
ermore, Solaris 2.4 does not even provide a facility
for user’s to change their NIS or NIS+ full name
(GECOS) ﬁeld or login shell.
Most UNIX systems also do not provide any
form of proactive password checking. This can lead
to users using very weak passwords which are
vulnerable to being compromised by software such
as crack.
When user’s identities are veriﬁed for purposes
of changing their password, most systems only
require the user to enter their current password. If
an intruder has compromised an account’s password,
then the usual methods for maintaining password
security, such as password aging, will fail to deny
access to the intruder. The ability to query the user
for multiple types of information known only to the
user and the password system (such as the user’s
SSN, mother’s maiden name, etc.) normally will
prevent intruders from maintaining access to
compromised accounts.
There are also some serious deﬁciencies in how
changes to the NIS passwd database are performed.
One of the most severe is that only one change to
the NIS passwd ﬁle can be made at a time. While
the NIS passwd ﬁle is being changed, all other
update attempts are refused. On a master NIS server
with a large number of passwd entries (e.g., more
than 1000), it can take a small, but substantial
amount of time to re-write the passwd ﬁle. If a
large number of users, such as a class of new users,
attempts to change their passwords at about the same
time, most users will be unable to because of this
single-step update mechanism.
SPM was designed to address these
deﬁciencies. It currently supports /etc style ﬁles and
NIS/YP on SunOS 4.1.x (Solaris 1.x), SunOS 5.x
(Solaris 2.x), and AIX 3.2.x. The code is very port-
able to new UNIX operating systems and support for
additional password facilities can be added in a very
straightforward manner.
The USC Environment
In order to provide more insight into the the
design and implementation of SPM, it is useful to
describe the environment at the University of South-
ern California (USC) that spawned SPM.
There are approximately 8,000 nodes attached
to USC networks. Of that number, about 1,300 are
UNIX machines, 2,000 are Macintosh machines, and
3,800 are PC class machines.
Computing at USC is separated into two main
types – Academic Computing (student computing,
research computing, basic computing, etc.) and
Administrative Computing (ﬁnancial records, student
records, etc.). University Computing Services (UCS)
is charged with providing support for Academic
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Computing directly to researchers and students, pro-
viding support for computing resources owned by
departments, and support of the campus networks
and Internet connections.
UCS supports a number of speciﬁc computing
facilities:
￿ The Research Computing Facility (RCF) con-
sists of Sun, SGI, Convex, and IBM compute
servers and is dedicated to providing a high-
end environment for performing research.
￿ The Student Computing Facility (SCF) con-
sists of about 10 Sun servers, and several hun-
dred Sun workstations for use by graduate and
undergraduate students for class related work.
￿ The Basic Computing Facility (BCF) consists
of a single Sun server dedicated to providing
free access to email, USENET News, and
WWW to any USC faculty, staff, or student.
Most hosts supported by UCS are conﬁgured to
use NIS1 (formerly YP). While most hosts are split
into small, independent NIS domains, there is one
large NIS domain that that currently has over 20,000
passwd entries and over 1,700 group entries. (Most
of the users in this domain are part of our Student
Computing Facility.) Needless to say, this has
allowed us to experience some of the major ﬂaws in
both the NIS design and implementation discussed in
this paper.
Vendor Provided Interfaces
Before describing SPM in detail, it is useful to
be familiar with the general functionality provided
by most vendor’s to allow user’s to change their
password information. Since it is not the intent of
this paper to provide an in-depth analysis of such
interfaces, most attention will be on generalities with
a few examples.
Description of /etc ﬁles
The most basic UNIX password database pro-
vided by virtually all UNIX vendors is the
/etc/passwd ﬁle. This ﬁle normally contains seven
ﬁelds, each separated by a semi-colon:
￿ username A user’s login name.
￿ password A user’s encrypted password.
￿ uid A numeric user identiﬁcation number.
￿ gid A numeric identiﬁcation number specify-
ing the user’s primary group.
￿ fullname A text ﬁeld contain the user’s full
name and/or other descriptive information.
This ﬁeld is sometimes referred to as the
GECOS ﬁeld.
￿ home The user’s home directory.
￿ shell The user’s login shell.
On most systems, there is a passwd command
that a user can run to change the password,
1We hope to move to NIS+ as soon as our internally
developed user account management system is updated.
fullname, and shell ﬁelds of their password entry.
For a user to change their password in /etc/passwd
they would normally run
% passwd
The passwd program will prompt the user for their
current password and conﬁrm that it matches what’s
currently set in /etc/passwd. The user is then
prompted for a new password and asked to re-enter
the new password to conﬁrm that it matches what
the user typed the ﬁrst time. Most passwd imple-
mentations perform a few basic evaluations of the
new password to test for acceptability. Usually this
only involves checking to insure the password is of a
minimum length.
Once a new password is conﬁrmed with the
user, the passwd program will then lock the
/etc/passwd ﬁle, usually by creating a /etc/ptmp
lock ﬁle, then it will update /etc/passwd itself. Usu-
ally this is done by writing out a new version of
/etc/passwd into the /etc/ptmp lock ﬁle, then instal-
ling /etc/ptmp as /etc/passwd.
On some newer systems there exists an auxili-
ary password database ﬁle, which is often called a
shadow password ﬁle and is usually named
/etc/shadow, that contains encrypted passwords as
well as password aging information. The shadow
password ﬁle is normally readable only by ‘‘root’’.
This prevents normal users from accessing all the
encrypted password ﬁelds and running a program
such as crack to guess user passwords. On such
systems, the password ﬁeld in /etc/passwd will only
contain something like ‘‘x’’ to indicate the encrypted
password is really located in /etc/shadow.
Description of NIS/YP
The Network Information Service (NIS, form-
erly called Yellow Pages) developed by Sun
Microsystems and licensed to most major UNIX ven-
dors, provides distributed access to to various system
databases, such as automount maps, group, passwd,
hosts, and others. The NIS protocols are based on a
client/server ONC RPC architecture.
Hosts utilizing NIS are grouped into NIS
domains. Each NIS domain has a single NIS master
server and may optionally have a number of NIS
slave servers. The NIS master contains the source
of all databases. The source databases are ASCII
ﬁles that are normally identical to their /etc
equivalents and, in fact, are often maintained and
built directly from their standard /etc locations. For
instance, on most systems the /etc/passwd ﬁle is
actually the default location of the NIS passwd data-
base source ﬁle on the NIS master.
NIS databases, or maps as they are usually
referred to, are stored in ndbm(3) ﬁles. Changes to
NIS maps are made by modifying the ASCII source
ﬁle for a particular map using an editor such as vi(1)
or by using a third-party program of some type or in
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the case of the passwd map, through the
rpc.yppasswdd server. Once the source ﬁle is
updated, the ndbm(3) ﬁles are updated by running
make(1) in the /var/yp directory. The make(1)
rebuilds the affected ndbm(3) databases from scratch
– there is no partial update mechanism provided in
NIS. Once the ndbm(3) databases are updated, the
ypserv(8) process on the NIS master (the local
machine where the database was just updated) is
notiﬁed of the update. Any NIS slave servers that
are conﬁgured are notiﬁed that a map has been
updated. When the ypserv(8) process on each NIS
slave server is notiﬁed of an update, they consult
with the NIS master server to check to see if the
master has a newer version of the map, and if so,
transfers the entire map to local disk storage.
The passwd database in NIS has a special set
of protocols and servers who provide a mechanism
to update NIS passwd data. When a NIS user wants
to change their password, they run yppasswd2 The
user is prompted in a fashion very similar to that
described in the previous section regarding normal
/etc/passwd conﬁgurations. However, instead of
reading and writing password information from
/etc/passwd directly, the yppasswd command
exchanges data with the rpc.yppasswdd server via
ONC RPC on the NIS master host. The
rpc.yppasswdd reads and writes the NIS passwd
source ﬁle, which is usually either
/var/yp/src/passwd or /etc/passwd. Changes to the
NIS passwd ﬁle are done by creating a lock ﬁle
(such as /var/yp/src/ptmp or /etc/ptmp), then creat-
ing a new passwd ﬁle with the requested changes,
installing the new passwd ﬁle, and then removing
the lock ﬁle. Once the passwd ﬁle is updated,
rpc.yppasswdd will by default run a make(1) to
update the passwd NIS map as previously described.
For systems with medium to large numbers of users,
it is a common practice to disable this feature and to
run the NIS make(1) via a cron8 job once per hour
or so.
Most NIS systems are conﬁgured by default
such that when one user changes their passwd infor-
mation, nobody else can change their own password
information until the passwd map has been updated
and pushed out to all NIS slave servers. This can
take anywhere from a few seconds to several hours
depending on the size and conﬁguration of a given
NIS domain. It is possible to modify the behavior of
the standard rpc.yppasswdd and how the NIS
Makeﬁle /var/yp/Makeﬁle operates such that users
are only blocked from passwd changes while the
actual NIS passwd source ﬁle is being updated.
However, this can take from a few seconds to
several minutes depending on how many users are in
a given NIS domain. If several dozen users try to
2Some systems provide a passwd program that has the
ability to handle NIS password changes.
change their passwords at once (which often happens
to user’s who are taking a class on UNIX for the ﬁrst
time), most will be prevented from doing so due to
the single threaded behavior of the NIS passwd
database.
Description of NIS+
The Network Information Service Plus (NIS+)
was created by Sun Microsystems as a replacement
for NIS. NIS+ was designed to address many of the
problems found in NIS. It speciﬁcally is intended to
support larger, more diverse conﬁgurations as well
as providing a much higher level of security and a
much improved administration interface. It can be
conﬁgured to support older NIS clients, but at the
cost of being only as secure as NIS allows.
Like NIS, NIS+ has a client/server architecture
utilizing ONC RPC as its communications protocol.
Hosts conﬁgured for NIS+ are grouped into NIS+
domains. Unlike NIS, each NIS+ domain can be
part of an tree structured enterprise namespace simi-
lar to the Domain Name System (DNS).
Each NIS+ domain has a primary server and
may optionally have any number of secondary
servers. Each NIS+ server runs the nisd(1m) pro-
gram which provides service to NIS+ clients.
Updates to NIS+ databases can be accomplished
through a command line interface, a GUI interface,
and through the NIS+ C API. Updates can be made
to any server, either the primary or any secondary.
Changes are automatically propagated to all NIS+
servers for a given domain. Unlike NIS, updates are
made by propagating the changed information and
not an entire database.
NIS+ databases are stored on disk in binary
format and then loaded into memory by nisd(1m) at
startup. Locking is done on an individual record
basis and not on a whole database basis. This
means that NIS+ servers can accept multiple changes
to the passwd database simultaneously.
Description of SPM
SPM was designed to address the deﬁciencies
in operation and functionality of password manage-
ment found in most UNIX implementations. It is
intended to provide a consistent interface to pass-
word management to users and system administrators
on an enterprise-wide scale. It normally is used to
replace vendor supplied programs such as passwd,
yppasswd, nispasswd, chsh, ypchsh, chfn, ypchfn,
and rpc.yppasswdd. SPM is a client/server based
system that utilizes ONC RPC for communication.
Consistent User Interface
The SPM user interface presents a consistent
look and feel across multiple versions of UNIX and
multiple types of password facilities such as /etc
ﬁles and NIS. This allows users to not have to
focus on the details of how to change their password
information on different UNIX systems. A nice
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beneﬁt of this is that users tend to spend a little
more energy on what they are doing (choosing a
secure password) instead of how they are doing it.
Enhancements for Large NIS Domains
In an environment where there are a large
number of users in a single NIS domain, updates to
the NIS passwd database can take a signiﬁcant
amount of time. The issue of users being locked out
of making changes whenever any one user makes a
change is also a major problem. To address these
issues, SPM supports the ability to take password
changes and quickly store them as transactions
which are later processed asynchronously. This
allows multiple users to change their password infor-
mation simultaneously.
Security Features
There are a number of features of SPM that
address different security issues.
User Veriﬁcation
SPM supports the ability to query the user for
multiple types of veriﬁcation information beyond
simply asking for a user’s current password. This
allows system administrators to have more
conﬁdence in the identity of a user whenever a user
is forced to change their password.
SPM allows the system administrator to specify
via the VerifyList variable in spm.conf which, if
any, additional types of veriﬁcation information are
required. The system administrator can also specify
that all or only a certain number of the veriﬁcation
information be veriﬁed correctly with the user.
The information used for veriﬁcation is located
in Personal Data databases on either or both the
local host where the user runs the spm command
and on a remote host speciﬁed by the system
administrator. See the section on Databases for a
description of the contents of the Personal Data
database.
Password History Checking
SPM supports the ability to keep a history of
each user’s passwords. Each time a user changes
their password, the Password History database is
checked to see if the new password has been used
before by that user. If it has been, the password is
rejected.
When a successful password has been chosen,
it is stored in its encrypted form in the Password
History database. The system administrator speciﬁes
how many passwords per user are kept in the history
database.
Password Checking
In addition to password history checking, SPM
provides an extensive set of password checking pro-
cedures. When a user changes their password, the
password is subjected to a series of rules to test how
vulnerable it is to common algorithms used to guess
passwords. The rules are partially based on most
realistic checks performed by the crack software.
The rules include checks against the user’s user-
name, full name ﬁeld, a large dictionary, minimum
length, character type mix, and other assorted rules.
Passwords that fail any of these tests are rejected
and the user is prompted to try another password.
Password Aging
Password aging3 is the ability to specify vari-
ous parameters about passwords on a per user basis.
The parameters control such things as how often a
user can or must change their password.
Security of SPM
A number of decisions were made during the
initial design of SPM that impact the overall security
of the SPM system itself. The basic thinking was
that the design be as secure as possible, but not so
secure that the time to implementation was severely
compromised. What resulted is a system that is no
less secure than the standard NIS conﬁguration, but
not as secure as we would like. We felt we did not
have the time, or the will to implement a fully
secure system that utilized some form of full encryp-
tion or public key access control.
The work being done to implement standard
forms of encryption at the packet and RPC level also
lead us to believe that our time is better spent con-
centrating on other aspects of security and func-
tionality. One such possibility is Sun’s Secure
RPC[1] which allows the use of DES or Kerberos
authentication and encryption in ONC RPC based
applications. Unfortunately, Secure RPC is not yet
widely available so SPM does not support it. A
future version of SPM may incorporate Secure RPC
depending on how available it becomes in the future.
The standard NIS conﬁguration utilizing the
ONC RPC based rpc.yppasswdd server is what we
considered the weakest form of security in standard
password management systems available today.
When using NIS, the client (yppasswd) and the
server (rpc.yppasswdd) exchange requests using
un-encrypted ONC RPC calls. The client program
sends the user’s current (old) password to the server
in un-encrypted, clear-text format in an RPC call.
Changes to a user’s password entry are sent by send-
ing a struct passwd structure. This means that
when changing a user’s password, the old password
is sent clear text and the new password is sent in its
encrypted format. Anybody watching the network
packets for such a session would see the user’s old
password in plain text and the user’s new password
in encrypted form. This would allow them to gather
encrypted passwords on which they could use pass-
word guessing software such as crack.
3While SPM supports a Password Aging database,
password aging support itself is not yet fully integrated
into SPM.
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In SPM, a similar approach to NIS is taken.
The user’s old password is sent plain text to the
server (spmd) for veriﬁcation. This is necessary in
order to verify the user’s password history and also
prevents a rogue client from guessing passwords by
querying spmd.
When changing password information in SPM,
only the information being changed is sent. That is,
if a user is changing their login shell then only the
new login shell data, along with some veriﬁcation
data, is sent to the server. In NIS, the entire passwd
structure is sent. This can allow a packet sniffer to
obtain more data about a user than is possible in
SPM.
In SPM, special care is given to the handling of
Personal Data information. When a user changes
their password, the spm program sends a query to
the spmd program on the Personal Data server host.
The server (spmd) responds by returning a code
indicating no records for the speciﬁed user exist, or
returns a Personal Data (struct PDinfo) structure
that has a single ‘‘x’’ in every ﬁeld for which infor-
mation exists. The client then queries the user for
each bit of information available and then sends the
user-supplied information to the server for
veriﬁcation. While this information does travel
plain-text to the server, this process does not allow a
rogue client to download data from the Personal
Data database.
The spmd program also limits access to itself
to speciﬁc hosts and networks. The variables
SPMaccess and PDaccess in the spm.conf ﬁle con-
trol this access. The PDaccess variable controls
what hosts and networks can make Personal Data
queries. The SPMaccess variable controls what
hosts and networks can query all the SPM databases
except for the Personal Data database.
Databases
SPM maintains and utilizes a number of data-
bases. All databases are stored in ndbm(3) format
in subdirectories under /var/spm. Database ﬁles are
named by domain name and are located in subdirec-
tories A domain name is deﬁned by whatever nam-
ing facility is in use on a SPM client. Usually this
is your NIS or NIS+ domain name. On hosts that
don’t run a naming service, the default domain name
is local.
An example conﬁguration would be a site with
a sales domain and an eng domain, the data for the
two will be stored separately for each type of data-
base. In this case, there would be the following
database ﬁles:
/var/yp/age/sales.{dir,pag}
/var/yp/age/eng.{dir,pag}
/var/yp/person/sales.{dir,pag}
/var/yp/person/eng.{dir,pag}
/var/yp/pwdhist/sales.{dir,pag}
/var/yp/pwdhist/eng.{dir,pag}
This feature permits a single spmd server to support
multiple domains.
Database Administration
The spmadm command is the primary tool
available to system administrators to administer the
SPM databases. This tool provides the ability to
directly read and update all SPM databases. It can
be used to lookup and delete individual records, as
well as retrieve and store records in ‘‘raw’’ format.
An administrator can use spmadm with the -set
key=value option to add or modify a speciﬁc record.
The -write option can be used to initially load a
SPM database, such as the Personal Data database.
Personal Data
The Personal Data database contains informa-
tion used by SPM to verify a user’s identity. The
type of data intended for this database are bits of
knowledge, that when used together with each other,
provide a higher level of conﬁdence that a user is
who they claim to be.
The following ﬁelds are currently supported:
￿ SSN The user’s Social Security Number or
other type of identiﬁcation.
￿ DOB The user’s Date Of Birth.
￿ MomName The maiden name of the user’s
mother.
￿ HomeZIP The user’s Home ZIP code.
Each record is keyed by a username.
The information is stored as text ﬁelds in
ndbm(3) databases usually located under
/var/spm/person. Sites may choose to store what-
ever ASCII data they wish in any of these ﬁelds.
However, there is no support at this time to custom-
ize the prompts presented to users when asked for
each bit of information. Modifying the source code
is the only means by which to do this, though this
can be done fairly easily.
Password History
The Password History database contains a
record of passwords that users have used before.
The information is stored as text ﬁelds in ndbm(3)
databases usually located under /var/spm/pwdhist.
Each password is stored in its original
encrypted form. Each record is keyed by username.
The data ﬁeld for each record contains a colon
separated list of previously used passwords in most-
recently-used to least-recently-used order.
The system administrator speciﬁes, through a
conﬁguration ﬁle, the maximum number, 10 by
default, of passwords to maintain in each entry.
When this limit is reached, the oldest password for a
given entry is deleted.
Password Aging
The Password Aging database contains records
that allow sites to specify certain policies regarding
password changes.
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The following records are currently supported:
￿ ModTime Last time a password was
modiﬁed.
￿ MinChg The minimum number of days
before a user can change their password
again.
￿ MaxValid The maximum number of days a
password is valid for before a user must
change their password.
￿ WarnTime The number of days a user is
warned to change their password before some
type of action is taken once MaxValid days is
reached.
￿ InActive The number of days an account can
be unused before a user must change their
password.
￿ ExpireDate The absolute date that the
account expires.
Architecture
The SPM software consists of a client and a
server which use ONC RPC as a communications
protocol and several stand-alone programs that use
direct ﬁle I/O. Figure 1 provides an overview on
how the various parts of SPM interact.
The spmd program is an RPC-based server that
processes requests from the spm client program. It
processes requests to access multiple password facil-
ity databases (e.g. /etc/passwd and NIS) as well as
requests for the Password Aging, Password History,
and Personal Data (veriﬁcation) databases.
The spm program is the interface between end
users and the spmd server. It allows users to
change their password, full name (GECOS) ﬁeld,
and login shell. Normally the passwd, yppasswd,
nispasswd, chfn, ypchfn, chsh, and ypchsh pro-
grams are replaced by symbolic links that point to
spm.
The spmtrans program is used to process tran-
sactions created by spmd if the system administrator
has enabled transaction logging. It uses direct ﬁle
I/O to access transactions, each of which is stored in
a separate ﬁle on the system where spmd and
spmtrans are run. Usually spmtrans is run periodi-
cally (such as once per hour) via the cron(8) facility
on an NIS master.
The spmadm program is used to administer the
Personal Data, Password Aging, and Password His-
tory databases. Its purpose is to provide a system
administrator a means by which data in the various
SPM database can be loaded, viewed, modiﬁed, and
deleted. It uses direct ndbm(3) ﬁle I/O on a
speciﬁed SPM database.
Conﬁguration
The spm, spmadm, spmd, and spmtrans pro-
grams all support the ability to conﬁgure SPM vari-
ables via the command line and via the spm.conf
conﬁguration ﬁle. Command line options override
any value speciﬁed in spm.conf.
All SPM programs utilize a single spm.conf
conﬁguration ﬁle on each host. This ﬁle allows the
system administrator to conﬁgure such things as
SPM database locations, servers, and access controls,
password facility ﬁles, transaction logging ﬂags, and
veriﬁcation information ﬂags.
On startup, each program searches for this ﬁle
in a compile-time speciﬁed set of locations. Usually
the locations are as follows:
/var/local/conf/spm.conf
/usr/lsd/conf/spm.conf
The ﬁrst ﬁle found is parsed. See the spm.conf(5)
man page in Appendix A for further details.
The spm program will do one of three things –
change a password, a full name, or a login shell –
depending on how it is invoked. The program’s
behavior is speciﬁed either by a command line
option or by the name of the program it was invoked
as. Table 1 shows the matrix of what triggers each
type of behavior.
Table 1: Behavior of spm
Command Program
Line Name Behavior
–chpw passwd Change Password
nispasswd
yppasswd
–chfn chfn Change Full Name
ypchfn
–chsh chsh Change Login Shell
ypchsh
User Examples
The spm program is the primary end-user inter-
face to SPM. It can be used to change a user’s pass-
word, full name (GECOS), and login shell. It is
designed to act like most UNIX passwd, chsh, and
chfn commands whenever possible.
In the following example, a user named smith
is changing his password. The system that smith is
logged into is conﬁgured to run NIS/YP. The spmd
server on the NIS/YP master is conﬁgured to do
transaction logging and the SPM personal data
server has smith’s social security number on ﬁle.
Here’s what the session would look like:
alcor.usc.edu(1): passwd
Changing nis password for smith on yp1.usc.edu . . .
Current Password:Go4Sleep
Please enter your Social Security Number: 123456789
New Password:$iAmHome
Retype new Password:$iAmHome
Your request to change your password information has
been queued for later processing.
This change may take up to two hours to take effect.
alcor.usc.edu(1):
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The message about being ‘‘queued for later process-
ing’’ is triggered by spmd on yp1.usc.edu being
conﬁgured to do transaction logging. The message
that ‘‘This change may take up to two hours to take
effect’’ is triggered by spmd on yp1.usc.edu also
being a NIS master and conﬁgured to not push out a
new passwd map itself.
In our next example, our test user smith is
changing his ofﬁce phone number and the comments
ﬁeld of his full name information on the same host
once again:
alcor.usc.edu(3): chfn
Changing nis ﬁnger (GECOS) for smith on yp1.usc.edu . . .
Current Password:$iAmHome
Default values are printed inside of ’[]’.
To accept the default, press the <RETURN> key.
To specify a blank entry, type the word ‘none’.
Full name (e.g. ‘John W. Smith’) [John Smith]: RETURN
Ofﬁce Location (e.g. ‘SAL 125’) [UCC 209]: RETURN
Ofﬁce Phone Number (e.g. ‘740-2957’) [02957]: 5551234
Home Phone Number (e.g. ‘213-777-3456’) [none]: RETURN
Comments (e.g. ‘My student account’) [Student]: PhD Student
Full Name: John Smith
Ofﬁce Location: UCC 209
Ofﬁce Phone Number: 5551234
Home Phone Number:
Comments: PhD Student
Is this information correct [Yes]? RETURN
Your request to change your ﬁnger (GECOS) information
has been queued for later processing.
This change may take up to two hours to take effect.
alcor.usc.edu(4):
In our ﬁnal example, our restless user smith is
now going to change his login shell from
/usr/usc/bin/tcsh to /usr/bin/csh:
alcor.usc.edu(7): chsh
Changing nis login shell for mtest on yp1.usc.edu . . .
Current Password:$iAmHome
Here is a list of shells you may choose from:
/bin/sh
/bin/csh
/usr/bin/sh
/usr/bin/csh
/usr/usc/bin/bash
/usr/usc/bin/tcsh
/usr/usc/etc/admshells/newpwd
/usr/usc/etc/admshells/ftp-only
/usr/usc/etc/pwd/forcepwd
/usr/usc/etc/ftp-only
/bin/ksh
/bin/rksh
Old Shell: /usr/usc/bin/tcsh
New shell: /usr/bin/csh
You have selected "/usr/bin/csh" as your new shell.
Is this information correct [Yes]? RETURN
Your request to change your login shell information
has been queued for later processing.
This change may take up to two hours to take effect.
alcor.usc.edu(8):
Operation
The spmd program is invoked by inetd(8) the
ﬁrst time a request for SPM service is received.
Before each RPC request is processed, a check is
performed to see if the client is authorized to make
such a request. Access is controlled by use of the
SPMaccess and PDaccess variables as described in
the spm.conf(5) man page and in the Security of
SPM section.
The spm command is invoked by a user
directly (on the command line) or indirectly (another
program such as login(1m) runs it). Upon startup,
the program ﬁrst determines what information should
be changed as described in the Conﬁguration sec-
tion. Next spm determines which Password Facility
(i.e /etc ﬁles, NIS, NISplus) to use by searching all
supported Password Facilities4 and using the ﬁrst
facility the user’s username appears in. A command
line option also allows a user to override this
behavior and specify which speciﬁc Password Facil-
ity they wish to use.
The search is done by calling Password Facil-
ity speciﬁc lookup routines. For instance, the NIS
function that is used is NIScheck(). It performs a
yp_match(3N) library call to lookup a given user in
NIS.
The spm program next determines what domain
name to use in future requests. This name is also
obtained in a facility speciﬁc manner. In the case of
NIS, the NIS domain name is used. In the case of
/etc ﬁles being the facility, the predeﬁned domain
name local is used.
Next, the spm program determines the name of
the host that is the SPMserver (sometimes referred
to as the Facility Server) for the Password Facility
that has been selected. This host is where spm
expects to contact the spmd server. This is also
done through use of a facility speciﬁc routine. In
the case of NIS, the yp_master(3N) library function
is used and returns the name of the NIS master host
for the local hosts’ NIS domain. In the case of the
/etc facility, the name of the local host is returned.
The spm program next will setup an RPC con-
nection to the spmd program on the SPMserver.
The SPMserver is then pinged by sending an RPC
NULLPROC request to spmd to determine if the
server is available. If the ping fails, an error is
displayed and the program exits. This is done so
that a user is not prompted for lots of information
only to be told the server is ‘‘unavailable’’.
The user is next prompted to enter their
Current Password. Once the user does so, the
password is sent off to the SPMserver for
veriﬁcation. The spmd program on the SPMserver
4Which facilities are supported and the order the
facilities are searched is determined at compile-time.
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checks the password against the user’s current pass-
word in the Password Facility speciﬁed in the
request by spm. If that fails, the password is then
checked against the password of ‘‘root’’ (on the
SPMserver). If the password was successfully
matched against the password for ‘‘root’’, a special
ﬂag is set. The results of these comparisons are then
returned to the spm client. If the results were suc-
cessful spm continues on, otherwise an error is
displayed and the program exits.
If the user is changing their full name or login
shell entries, they are next prompted for the new
information as shown in the User Examples section.
Default values are taken from their current entries in
the Password Facility being changed.
If the user is changing their password and the
user did not supply the ‘‘root’’ password previously,
the spm program will try to verify the user’s identity
using the information found in the Personal Data
database on the Personal Data server (PDserver).
The PDserver is a host running spmd that is either
speciﬁed by the system administrator in the
spm.conf ﬁle or else is the same as the SPMserver.
A query is ﬁrst sent to the PDserver to determine
what types of Personal Data are available for the
speciﬁed user. The user is then prompted to enter
each type of information the PDserver indicated it
had on ﬁle. Each type of information is checked, as
it is supplied by the user, by sending it to the
PDserver for veriﬁcation. If the information is
incorrect, the user is told so and prompted to try
again. When the information is correctly supplied,
spm prompts the user for the next type of informa-
tion and the process continues. The user is not
allowed to proceed until all veriﬁcation information
is correctly supplied. The user will be asked a max-
imum number of times for a given type of informa-
tion. If they cannot correctly supply the information
within that maximum, an error is returned and the
program exits.
Once a user successfully completes the PD
veriﬁcation process they are prompted to enter a
New Password. The New Password is then sub-
jected to a series of tests that are described in the
Password Checking section. The new password is
then sent to the SPMserver to be checked in the
Password History database to see if the user has
used this password previously. Upon successful
completion of this stage, the user is then prompted
to Retype New Password. This password is com-
pared against the ﬁrst one the user supplied to insure
that they both match.
Once the new password, full name or login
shell information is successfully entered, the spm
program sends a change request with the new infor-
mation to the SPMserver. The SPMserver then
applies the changes immediately or the changes are
logged for later application if Transaction Logging
is enabled.
If the user has changed their password, the
SPMserver also adds the user’s old password to the
Password History database and also updates, or
creates if needed, the user’s Password Aging data-
base entry.
If the facility being changed is NIS and the
system administrator has speciﬁed a value for the
NISPostCmd variable in the spm.conf ﬁle (usually
the value is ‘‘cd /var/yp && make passwd’’), then
that command is then run to push out the changes to
all NIS servers.
Transaction Logging
The Transaction Logging feature in SPM
allows updates to the NIS passwd database to be
quickly accepted by spmd and batched up for later
processing. This allows multiple users to simultane-
ously submit passwd change requests without being
denied service because the NIS passwd database is
locked by another user as is the case in a standard
NIS environment.
The sysadmin enables Transaction Logging via
the TransFacList variable in the spm.conf ﬁle.
This variable contains a list of Password Facilities
which should use Transaction Logging.
Transactions are created by the spmd server
and later processed by the spmtrans program which
is usually run once per hour via the cron(8) facility.
If Transaction Logging is enabled when spmd
receives a change request, the request is stored in its
own ﬁle in a Password Facility speciﬁc directory
under /var/spm/transactions, i.e., the directory used
for the NIS facility is /var/spm/transactions/nis.
The transaction ﬁle name is in the format:
Format.ID.Revision
The Format portion of the name indicates what for-
mat the contents of the ﬁle are in. Currently, only
the spmtr1 format is used. The ID.Revision parts
form a unique and ascending number such that new
transactions have a greater numeric ID.Revision
value than older transactions. This is done so that
spmtrans knows the order in which to process the
transactions. The ID portion is created using the
value returned by the time(2) function. The Revi-
sion portion is a counter that starts at ‘‘0’’ and is
used to help generate a unique ﬁle name.
Once the ﬁlename is generated, a call to
open(2) with the O_CREAT (create ﬁle) and
O_EXCL (exclusive ﬁle creation) ﬂags speciﬁed. If
the open(2) fails due to an EEXISTS (ﬁle exists)
error, another call to time(2) is made, the Revision
number is incremented, and another open(2) call is
made. This process repeats itself until the exclusive
ﬁle creation succeeds or a maximum threshold value
(speciﬁed at compile-time) is reached.
Once the transaction ﬁle is successfully created,
the ﬁle is locked and the transaction data is written
in the following form:
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UserName:Type:OldValue:NewValue
The UserName ﬁeld indicates which username in the
password database the transaction should be applied
to. The Type ﬁeld indicates what type of informa-
tion the transaction applies to. Currently, the valid
names are pwd, shell, and gecos. The OldValue
ﬁeld is used to indicate what the contents of the
database was when the transaction was created. If
this ﬁeld does not match what is in the database
when the transaction is processed, the transaction is
discarded. The NewValue ﬁeld contains the informa-
tion that should be placed into the database.
Once spmd writes the data to the transaction
ﬁle, the ﬁle is unlocked and closed. A message is
logged via the syslog(3) facility detailing the change
and a another message is returned to the client
(spm) stating that the request ‘‘has been queued for
later processing’’.
The transaction ﬁles are processed when
spmtrans is run (usually via the cron(8) facility).
Upon startup, spmtrans searches for and reads a
spm.conf conﬁguration ﬁle. The TransFacList vari-
able is used to determine which Password Facilities
should be checked for transactions that need to be
processed. A directory search for transaction ﬁles
(as described previously) is performed for each Pass-
word Facility transaction directory (/var/spm
/transactions/facility). Each transaction ﬁle that is
found is locked and then read into memory. The
transactions are sorted in memory by username,i n
newest to oldest order, which is determined by the
numeric value of the transaction’s ﬁlename.
Once all transaction ﬁles are read, all transac-
tions for each type of possible change operation
(PWD, GECOS, SHELL) are processed in one
database update operation, if possible. e.g., The
/var/yp/src/passwd ﬁle would be written once with
all PWD (password) changes, then it would be writ-
ten again with all GECOS changes (if any).
During the processing of transactions, the
current value found in the facility database is com-
pared against the OldValue ﬁeld in the transaction.
If the two ﬁelds do not match, the transaction is con-
sidered out-of-date and discarded. Since the transac-
tions are processed in newest to oldest order, this
eliminates having to do multiple updates to the same
entry and insures only the most recent change is
applied.
Once the transactions are all processed, the
transaction ﬁles are unlocked and each transaction
that was successfully applied is deleted.
Performance
Probably the most important aspect of perfor-
mance for a password management system is how
quickly a user can change their password. While
there is not much empirical data available, some
rough comparisons are still possible. During peek
usage at USC, a class of 30 users in a single NIS
domain with 20,133 users running spmd5 with Tran-
saction Logging enabled can change their passwords
simultaneously with only about a 15 second wait
once the change request is sent to spmd. The same
requests take another 15 seconds or so to be applied
to the NIS passwd source ﬁle by spmtrans.I n a
standard NIS environment with this same scenario,
only one user at a time would be able to change
their password.
Related Work
SPM is not the ﬁrst attempt to supplement or
replace vendor password systems. A number of pub-
lic domain programs has been available for several
years. Some comparisons to some of these programs
are made in the following sections.
Comparison to npasswd
The npasswd[2] program has been distributed
since about 1989. Like SPM, npasswd is intended
to replace a vendor supplied passwd program. It
supports SunOS 4.x /etc/passwd and NIS/YP pass-
word facilities.
The main feature this program supports is the
ability to check a user’s new password to ‘‘disallow
simple-minded passwords’’ in a manner similar to
SPM’s pro-active password checking. It also allows
a system administrator to use a conﬁguration ﬁle to
specify different policies and parameters that affect
its password checking routines.
Unlike SPM, however, npasswd does not sup-
port the ability to change a user’s full name
(GECOS) or login shell ﬁelds. There is also no
facility for handling password history or additional
user veriﬁcation procedures.
Comparison to passwd+
The passwd+[3] program has been in existence
in various forms since at least 1992. Like npasswd
it supports extensive pro-active password checking
as its main feature. It also has an even more exten-
sive conﬁguration ﬁle that allows a system adminis-
trator to ﬁnely tune password checking policy and
local environment characteristics. It does include
support for changing full name and login shell infor-
mation. However, it appears to only support
/etc/passwd facilities, though a more current version
of the software may support NIS. It also does not
support SPM features such as password history,
password aging, and additional user veriﬁcation.
Current Status
SPM has been in campus-wide use at USC
since August, 1994. It currently supports SunOS
5The server running spmd in this case is a heavily
loaded Sun SPARCserver 490 with 128MB of memory
running SunOS 4.1.3.
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4.1.x, SunOS 5.x (Solaris 2.x), and AIX 3.2.5 operat-
ing systems. The /etc ﬁle password ﬁles and
NIS/YP are the currently supported Password Facili-
ties. Support for HP/UX and IRIX are planned in
the near future. There is some support for NIS+ in
place, but that code has not been tested yet.
Future Directions
The issue of RPC encryption remains an impor-
tant item awaiting a good solution. It is hoped that
something such as Sun’s Secure RPC software or
DCE Security Services becomes widely available.
The veriﬁcation database should be abstracted
to allow sites to specify arbitrary types of
veriﬁcation information and the labels presented to
users for that information. For example, not every
site has SSN data. Some sites might have
‘‘employee numbers’’ they want to use instead. A
system administrator should be able to conﬁgure
SPM to prompt for Employee Number: instead of
for a Social Security Number:.
It might also be useful to add the ability for the
system administrator to specify different types of
options for the pro-active password testing. This
would require a bit of an overhaul of the password
checking routines, but should not be a major prob-
lem.
Conclusions
Since SPM’s initial deployment at USC, it has
eliminated major problems with inconsistent user
interfaces, bugs in vendor provided programs,
enhanced security, and allowed us to continue to
grow and better support a large NIS environment.
Its portable design and implementation allow us to
support multiple platforms and password facilities
both now and into the future.
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Availability
SPM will be available for FTP from
usc.edu:/pub/spm by September 1, 1995.
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